By Malik Samuel
In a stark reflection of the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria’s northwest, communities in Bagega and Kawaye districts in Anka Local Government Area of Zamfara State have taken the extraordinary step of negotiating directly with bandits to secure a semblance of peace, especially as the rains set in and the farming season approaches. This move underscores the desperation of communities left vulnerable by the absence of effective government intervention.
For nearly three weeks leading up to 8 May, these communities were under siege. Bandits imposed a blockade, preventing movement in and out of Bagega, shutting down its market, and bringing economic activity to a standstill. The siege resulted in the kidnapping of dozens and the deaths of at least 13 people. A military convoy operated only once weekly – without it, people risked being killed by bandits lying in wait.
Residents say the bandits’ camps are dangerously close, just 15 kilometers away from Bagega, placing surrounding villages under constant threat.
With the planting season fast approaching and no government relief in sight, residents, through their district heads, appealed to the Emir of Anka for permission to negotiate. Acknowledging the government’s failure and the siege since April 21, the Emir consented, though he declined direct involvement due to the lack of official authorisation and the state’s stance against negotiations.
Negotiating with the enemy
The peace meeting took place on 8 May in Bagega. Representing the bandits were Ado Alero, Najaja, Buba Ice, Mati, Alhaji Makwaro, and Buba Gidan Gaba. Community representatives included district and village heads, youth leaders, union executives, political party chairmen, and religious figures.
The bandits accused the communities of sharing intelligence with the military, particularly following the 2024 death of their leader, Kachalla Halilu Sububu. In response, they demanded ₦30 million (down from ₦50 million), 10 Honda motorcycles, a full exit from vigilante groups including the Community Protection Guards, return of all government-issued motorcycles, and open access to Bagega market for livestock trade.
In exchange, they promised to release abductees, halt kidnappings, and allow farming to resume. A deadline of 16 May was set for the fulfilment of these terms.
Forced labour for protection
Just months before the peace talks, the bandits demonstrated their grip on the area. From November 25 to 28, 2024, Najaja forced 800 men and boys from 17 communities across four districts to harvest and process over 1,200 bags of guinea corn on a farm he inherited from Sububu. In return, the communities were allowed to harvest their own crops unmolested.
Government’s tepid response
The federal and state governments’ failure to protect these communities, especially those closest to bandit camps, pushed them into this negotiation. Locals described the weekly military convoy as insufficient. The talks weren’t a choice – they were a necessity, a bid to halt killings and economic collapse.
Just a day after the 8 May meeting, signs of success emerged. On 9 May, 43 abductees, including 17 women and 8 children, were released. Another 60 were freed on 11 May. Residents saw this as proof they had made the right call. But they knew lasting peace would depend on meeting the bandits’ conditions.
A day before the deadline, the ₦30 million ransom was paid. But the communities couldn’t deliver the 10 motorcycles due to a state ban requiring government or military approval for such purchases. The bandits, aware of the ban, demanded cash instead, plus ₦500,000 per motorcycle as a dealer’s commission. Recognizing the communities’ effort, they reduced the demand to five motorcycles. On 17 May, after terms were met, Bagega’s market reopened. Locals said it was the busiest it had been in years.
This deal exposes the government’s failure. Despite knowing about the talks, authorities offered no support – only the existing motorcycle purchase ban that forced locals to monetise the demand instead. The bandits’ ability to bypass the restriction highlights how weak the government’s measures have become.
Ado Alero’s influence
While bandit networks lack formal hierarchy, this negotiation revealed that some leaders command respect. Najaja deferred to Ado Alero, a major figure in Tsafe LGA, who was invited to oversee the meeting. Alero’s influence extends across the northwest. He has mediated inter-gang disputes and was instrumental in preventing a violent clash in December 2024 after the killing of Najaja’s brother by a rival bandit.
Alero gained national notoriety in 2022 when Emir Aliyu Marafa controversially turbaned him as Sarkin Fulani of Yandoto Emirate, sparking public outrage and the Emir’s suspension. The move was justified by some as a pragmatic bid for peace, given Alero’s territorial control.
Recognising Alero’s role could inform the government’s non-kinetic approach to tackling banditry. Engaging such influential actors may help bring others into peace processes.
Civilian-led negotiations and national security
The Bagega and Kawaye case reflects a broader crisis across northwest Nigeria. Communities are increasingly forced to cut deals with terrorists for survival. This reality raises serious concerns about the government’s ability, and willingness, to protect its citizens.
Dozens of communities across Zamfara, from Anka to Shinkafi, have struck similar deals. Some pay “protection fees” or farming levies; others provide labour or surrender local control. Failure to meet bandits’ terms often triggers deadly retaliation.
The normalisation of these arrangements, even when authorities quietly look the other way, risks legitimising banditry. It erodes the rule of law and reinforces the public’s belief that the government is either incapable or indifferent. This growing sense of abandonment threatens national unity and allows criminal rule to flourish.
A path forward
To confront the deepening crisis, governments must complement military efforts with sustained non-kinetic strategies. This includes community engagement, economic empowerment, and dialogue with actors like Alero. Forming local peace committees involving traditional leaders, clerics, and credible go-betweens could formalise negotiations. Simultaneously, rural development, via agricultural support, road access, and revived local markets, can reduce communities’ vulnerability to bandit dominance.
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Malik Samuel is a senior researcher at Good Governance Africa-Nigeria. Before joining GGA, he was a researcher with the Institute for Security Studies, specialising in the Boko Haram conflict in the Lake Chad Basin Region. Malik also worked as a conflict researcher with Amnesty International Nigeria. He was also a Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders field communications manager in Northeast Nigeria. Before that, he was an investigative journalist at the Abuja-based International Centre for Investigative Reporting. Malik holds a Master’s degree in Conflict, Peace, and Security from the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).
